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Abstract
Nowadays, there are plenty of works introducing con-
volutional neural networks (CNNs) to the steganal-
ysis and exceeding conventional steganalysis algo-
rithms. These works have shown the improving po-
tential of deep learning in information hiding domain.
There are also several works based on deep learning
to do image steganography, but these works still have
problems in capacity, invisibility and security. In this
paper, we propose a novel CNN architecture named
as ISGAN to conceal a secret gray image into a color
cover image on the sender side and exactly extract the
secret image out on the receiver side. There are three
contributions in our work: (i) we improve the invisi-
bility by hiding the secret image only in the Y chan-
nel of the cover image; (ii) We introduce the gener-
ative adversarial networks to strengthen the security
by minimizing the divergence between the empirical
probability distributions of stego images and natural
images. (iii) In order to associate with the human
visual system better, we construct a mixed loss func-
tion which is more appropriate for steganography to
generate more realistic stego images and reveal out
more better secret images. Experiment results show
that ISGAN can achieve start-of-art performances on
LFW, PASCAL-VOC12 and ImageNet datasets.
∗This work was supported by the National key Research and
Development Program of China(No.2016YFB0800404) and the
NSF of China(U1636112,U1636212).
†Shiqi Dong is the corresponding author.
1 Introduction
Image steganography is the main content of informa-
tion hiding. The sender conceal a secret message into
a cover image, then get the container image called
stego, and finish the secret message’s transmission
on the public channel by transferring the stego im-
age. Then the receiver part of the transmission can
reveal the secret message out. Steganalysis is an at-
tack to the steganography algorithm. The listener
on the public channel intercept the image and ana-
lyze whether the image contains secret information.
Since their proposed, steganography and steganalysis
promote each other’s progress.
Image steganography can be used into the trans-
mission of secret information, watermark, copyright
certification and many other applications. In gen-
eral, we can measure a steganography algorithm by
capacity, invisibility and security. The capacity is
measured by bits-per-pixel (bpp) which means the
average number of bits concealed into each pixel of
the cover image. With the capacity becomes larger,
the security and the invisibility become worse. The
invisibility is measured by the similarity of the stego
image and its corresponding cover image. The invis-
ibility becomes better as the similarity going higher.
The security is measured by whether the stego im-
age can be recognized out from natural images by
steganalysis algorithms. Correspondingly, there are
two focused challenges constraining the steganogra-
phy performance. The amount of hidden message
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2 RELATED WORKS 2
alters the quality of stego images. The more message
in it, the easier the stego image can be checked out.
Another keypoint is the cover image itself. Conceal-
ing message into noisy, rich semantic region of the
cover image yields less detectable perturbations than
hiding into smooth region.
Nowadays, traditional steganography algorithms,
such as S-UNIWARD [1], J-UNIWARD [1], conceal
the secret information into cover images’ spatial do-
main or transform domains by hand-crafted embed-
ding algorithms successfully and get excellent invis-
ibility and security. With the rise of deep learning
in recent years, deep learning has become the hottest
research method in computer vision and has been in-
troduced into information hiding domain. Volkhon-
skiy et al. [7] proposed a steganography enhancement
algorithm based on GAN, they concealed secret mes-
sage into generated images with conventional algo-
rithms and enhanced the security. But their gener-
ated images are warping in semantic, which will be
drawn attention easily. Tang et al. [9] proposed an
automatic steganographic distortion learning frame-
work, their generator can find pixels which are suit-
able for embedding and conceal message into them,
their discriminator is trained as a steganalyzer. With
the adversarial training, the model can finish the
steganography process. But this kind of method has
low capacity and is less secure than conventional algo-
rithms. Baluja [12] proposed a convolutional neural
network based on the structure of encoder-decoder.
The encoder network can conceal a secret image into
a same size cover image successfully and the decoder
network can reveal out the secret image completely.
This method is different from other deep learning
based models and conventional steganography algo-
rithms, it has large capacity and strong invisibility.
But stego images generated by this model is distorted
in color and its security is bad. Inspired by Baluja’s
work, we proposed an invisible steganography via
generative adversarial network named ISGAN. Our
model can conceal a gray secret image into a color
cover image with the same size, and our model has
large capacity, strong invisibility and high security.
Comparing with previous works, the main contribu-
tions of our work are as below:
1. In order to suppress the distortion of stego im-
ages, we select a new steganography position. We
only embed and extract secret information in the Y
channel of the cover image. The color information is
all in Cr and Cb channels of the cover image and can
be saved completely into stego images, so the invisi-
bility is strengthened.
2. From the aspect of mathematics, the differ-
ence between the empirical probability distributions
of stego images and natural images can be measured
by the divergence. So we introduce the generative
adverasial networks to increase the security through-
out minimizing the divergence. In addition, we in-
troduce several architectures from classic computer
vision tasks to fuse the cover image and the secret
image together better and get faster training speed.
3. In order to fit the human visual system (HVS)
better, we introduce the structure similarity index
(SSIM) [17] and its variant to construct a mixed loss
function. The mixed loss function helps to gener-
ate more realistic stego images and reveal out bet-
ter secret images. This point is never considered by
any previous deep-learning-based works in informa-
tion hiding domain.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec. 2
discusses related works, Sec. 3 introduces architecture
details of ISGAN and the mixed loss function. Sec. 4
gives details of different datasets, parameter settings,
our experiment processes and results. Finally, Sec. 5
concludes the paper with relevant discussion.
2 Related Works
Steganalysis There have been plenty of works us-
ing deep learning to do image steganalysis and got ex-
cellent performance. Qian et al. [3] proposed a CNN-
based steganalysis model GNCNN, the model intro-
duced the hand-crafted KV filter to extract resid-
ual noise and used the gaussian activation function
to get more useful features. The performance of
the GNCNN is inferior to the state-of-the-art hand-
crafted feature set spatial rich model (SRM) [2]
slightly. Based on GNCNN, Xu et al. [4] presented
Batch Normalization [19] in to prevent the network
falling into the local minima. XuNet was equipped
with Tanh, 1 × 1 convolution, global average pool-
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ing, and got comparable performance to SRM [2].
Ye et al. [5] put forward YeNet which surpassed
SRM and its several variants. YeNet used 30 hand-
crafted filters from SRM to prepropose images, ap-
plied well-designed activation function named TLU
and selection-channel module to strengthen features
from rich texture region where is more suitable for
hiding information. Zeng et al. [6] proposed a JPEG
steganalysis model with less parameters than XuNet
and got better performance than XuNet. These
works have applied deep learning to steganalysis suc-
cessfully, but there is still space for improvement.
Steganography Since its introduction, generative
adversarial networks[25] have received more and more
attention, achieved the state-of-art performance on
tasks such as image generation, style transfer, speech
synthesis and so on. The earliest application of
deep learning to steganography was based on GAN.
Volkhonskiy et al. [7] proposed a DCGAN-based [26]
model SGAN. SGAN consists of a generator network
for generating cover images, a discriminator network
for discriminating generated images from real images
and a steganalyzer network for steganalysis. Hiding
information in cover images generated by SGAN is se-
curer than in natural images. Shi et al. [8] proposed
SSGAN based on WGAN [27], their work was similar
to SGAN and got better outcome. However, stego
images generated by models similar to SGAN and
SSGAN are warping in semantic and are more eas-
ily to draw attention than natural images, although
these models reduce the detection rate of steganal-
ysis algorithms. Tang et al. [9] proposed an auto-
matic steganographic distortion learning framework
named as ASDL-GAN. The generator can translate
a cover image into an embedding change probabil-
ity matrix and the discriminator incorporates the
XuNet architecture. In order to fit the optimal em-
bedding simulator as well as propagate the gradient
in back propagation, they proposed a ternary em-
bedding simulator (TES) activation function. ASDL-
GAN can learn steganographic distortions automati-
cally, but its performance is inferior to S-UNIWARD.
Yang et al. [10] improved ASDL-GAN and achieved
better performance than S-UNIWARD. They used
Selection-Channel-Aware (SCA) [5] in generator as
well as the U-Net framework [28] which is introduced
from the medical images segmentation. However,
ASDL-GAN still refers too many prior knowledge
from conventional steganography algorithms and its
capacity is small. Hayes [11] proposed a GAN-based
model to hide a secret message into a cover image,
and could reveal the secret message by his decoder
successfully, but the invisibility is weak.
Baluja [12] designed a CNN model to conceal a
color secret image into a color cover image yield-
ing state-of-art performance. Atique et al. [13] pro-
posed another encoder-decoder based model to finish
the same steganography task (their secret images are
gray images). This is a novel steganography method
which gets rid of hand-crafted algorithms. It can
learn how to merge the cover image and the secret
image together automatically. But stego images gen-
erated by their models are distorted in color. As
shown in Fig. 4, Atique’s stego images are yellow-
ing when compared with the corresponding cover im-
ages. And their stego images are easily recognized
by well trained CNN-based steganalyzer [12] because
of the large capacity. Inspired by works of Baluja
and Atique, we improve each shortcoming and get
ISGAN.
3 Our Approach
The complete architecture of our model is shown in
Fig. 1. In this section, the new steganography po-
sition is introduced firstly. Then we discuss about
our design considerations on the basic model and
show specfic details of the encoder and the decoder.
Thirdly, we present why the generative adversarial
networks can improve the security and details of the
discriminator. Finally, we explain the motivation to
construct the mixed loss function.
3.1 New Steganography Position
Works of Baluja [12] and Atique [13] have imple-
mented the entire hiding and revealing procedure,
while their stego images’ color is distorted as shown
in Fig. 4. To against this weakness, we select a new
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Figure 1: The overall architecture. The encoder network conceals a gray secret image into the Y channel
of a same size cover image, then the Y channel output by the encoder net and the U/V channels constitute
the stego image. The decoder network reveals the secret image from the Y channel of the stego image.
The steganalyzer network tries to distinguish stego images from cover images thus improving the overall
architecture’s security.
steganography position. As shown in Fig. 2, a color
image in the RGB color space can be divided into R,
G and B channels, and each channel contains both
semantic information and color information. When
converted to the YCrCb color space, a color image
can be divided into Y, Cr and Cb channels. The Y
channel only contains part of semantic information,
luminance information and no color information, Cr
and Cb channels contain part of semantic informa-
tion and all color information. To guarantee no color
distortion, we conceal the secret image only in the Y
channel and all color information are saved into the
stego image. In addition, we select gray images as our
secret images thus decreasing the secret information
by 23 .
When embedding, the color image is converted to
the YCrCb color space, then the Y channel and the
gray secret image are concatenated together and then
are input to the encoder network. After hiding, the
encoder’s output and the cover image’s CrCb chan-
nels constitute the color stego image. When reveal-
ing, we get the revealed secret image through decod-
ing the Y channel of the stego image. Besides, the
transformation between the RGB color space and the
YCrCb color space is just the weighted computation
of three channels and doesn’t affect the backprop-
agation. So we can finish this tranformation dur-
ing the entire hiding and revealing process. The
encoder-decoder architecture can be trained end-to-
end, which is called as the basic model.
3.2 Basic Model
Conventional or classic image stegnography are usu-
ally designed in a heuristic way. Generally, these al-
gorithms decide whether to conceal information into
a pixel of the cover image and how to conceal 1 bit
information into a pixel. So the key of the clas-
sic steganography methods is well hand-crafted algo-
rithms, but all of these algorithms need lots of exper-
tise and this is very difficult for us. The best solution
is to mix the secret image with the cover image very
well without too much expertise. Deep learning, rep-
resented by convolutional neural networks, is a good
way to achieve this exactly. What we need to do is to
design the structure of the encoder and the decoder
as described below.
Based on such a starting point, we introduce the in-
ception module [21] in our encoder network. The in-
ception module has excellent performance on the Im-
ageNet classification task, which contains several con-
volution kernels with different kernel sizes as shown
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Figure 2: Three images in the first column are orig-
inal RGB color images. Three images in the right of
the first row are R channel, G channel and B chan-
nel of the original image respectively saved as gray
images, three channels all constitutes the luminance
information and color information. Three images in
the right of the second row are Y channel, Cr chan-
nel and Cb channel respectively saved as gray images,
and three images in the right of the third row are also
Y channel, Cr channel and Cb channel respectively
from Wikipedia. We can see that, the Y channel con-
stitutes only the luminance information and semantic
information, and the color information about chromi-
nance and chroma are all in the Cr channel and the
Cb channel.
in Fig. 3. Such a model structure can fuse feature
maps with different receptive field sizes very well.
As shown in both residual networks [20] and batch
normalization [19], a model with these modifications
can achieve the performance with significantly fewer
training steps comparing to its original version. So
we introduce both residual module and batch nor-
malization into the encoder network to speed up the
training procedure. The detail structure of the en-
coder is described in Tab. 1. When using MSE as the
metric on LFW dataset, we use our model to train
for 30 epochs to get the performance Atique’s model
can achieve while training for 50 epochs.
On the other hand, we need a structure to re-
veal the secret image out automatically. So we use
a fully convolutional network as the decoder net-
work. Feature maps output by each convolutional
Figure 3: The inception module with residual short-
cut we use in our work.
Table 1: Architecture details of the encoder network:
ConvBlock1 represents 3×3 Conv+BN+LeakyReLU,
ConvBlock2 represents 1× 1 Conv+Tanh, Inception-
Block represents the inception module with residual
shortcut as shown in Fig. 3.
Layers process Output size
Input / 2× 256× 256
Layer 1 ConvBlock1 16× 256× 256
Layer 2 InceptionBlock 32× 256× 256
Layer 3 InceptionBlock 64× 256× 256
Layer 4 InceptionBlock 128× 256× 256
Layer 5 InceptionBlock 256× 256× 256
Layer 6 InceptionBlock 128× 256× 256
Layer 7 InceptionBlock 64× 256× 256
Layer 8 InceptionBlock 32× 256× 256
Layer 9 ConvBlock1 16× 256× 256
Output ConvBlock2 1× 256× 256
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Table 2: Architecture details of the decoder network:
ConvBlock1 represents 3×3 Conv+BN+LeakyReLU,
ConvBlock2 represents 1× 1 Conv+Sigmoid.
Layers process Output size
Input / 1× 256× 256
Layer 1 ConvBlock1 32× 256× 256
Layer 2 ConvBlock1 64× 256× 256
Layer 3 ConvBlock1 128× 256× 256
Layer 4 ConvBlock1 64× 256× 256
Layer 5 ConvBlock1 32× 256× 256
Output ConvBlock2 1× 256× 256
layer have the same size. To speed up training, we
add a batch normalization layer after each convolu-
tional layer other than the last layer. Details of the
decoder network are described in Tab. 2.
3.3 Our steganalyzer
Works of Baluja and Atique didn’t consider the se-
curity problem, while the security is the keypoint in
steganography. In our work, we want to take the
steganalysis into account automatically throughout
training the basic model.
Denoting C as the set of all cover images c, the se-
lection of cover images from C can be described by a
random variable c on C with probability distribution
function (pdf) P . Assuming the cover images are se-
lected with pdf P and embedded with a secret image
which is chosen from its corresponding set, the set of
all stego images is again a random variable s on C
with pdf Q. The statistical detectability can be mea-
sured by the Kullback-Leibler divergence [15] shown
in (1) or the Jensen-Shannon divergence shown in (2).
KL(P ||Q) =
∑
c∈C
P (c)log
P (c)
Q(c)
(1)
JS(P ||Q) = 1
2
KL(P‖P +Q
2
) +
1
2
KL(Q‖P +Q
2
)
(2)
The KL divergence or the JS divergence is a very
fundamental quantity because it provides bounds on
the best possible steganalyzer one can build [16]. So
the keypoint for us is how to decrease the divergence.
The generative adversarial networks (GAN) are well-
designed in theory to achieve this exactly. The ob-
jective of the original GAN is to minimize the JS di-
vergence (2), a variant of the GAN is to minimize the
KL divergence (1). The generator network G, which
input is a noise z, tries to transform the input to a
data sample which is similar to the real sample. The
discriminator network D, which input is the real data
or the fake data generated by the generator network,
determines the difference between the real and fake
samples. D and G play a two-player minmax game
with the value function (3).
min
G
max
D
= Ex∼pdata(x)[logD(x)]+Ez∼pz(z)[log(1−D(G(z)))]
(3)
Now we introduce the generative adversarial net-
works into our architecture. The basic model can
finish the entire hiding and revealing process, so we
use the basic model as the generator, and introduce a
CNN-based steganalysis model as the discriminator
and the steganalyzer. So the value function in our
work becomes (4), where D represents the stegana-
lyzer network, G represents the basic model, x, s and
G(x, s) represent the cover image, the secret image
and the generated stego image respectively.
min
G
max
D
= Ex∼P (x)[logD(x)]+Ex∼P (x),s∼P (s)[log(1−D(G(x, s)))]
(4)
Xu et al.[4] studied the design of CNN structure
specific for image steganalysis applications and pro-
posed XuNet. XuNet embeds an absolute activa-
tion (ABS) in the first convolutional layer to improve
the statistical modeling, applies the TanH activation
function in early stages of networks to prevent overfit-
ting, and adds batch normalization (BN) before each
nonlinear activation layer. This well-designed CNN
provides excellent detection performance in steganal-
ysis. So we design our steganalyzer based on XuNet
and adapt it to fit our stego images. In addition, we
use the spatial pyramid pooling (SPP) module to re-
place the global average pooling layer. The spatial
pyramid pooling (SPP) module[22] and its variants,
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Table 3: Architecture details of the stegan-
alyzer network: ConvBlock1 represents 3 × 3
Conv+BN+LeakyReLU+AvgPool, ConvBlock2 rep-
resents 1 × 1 Conv+BN and ConvBlock3 represents
1 × 1 Conv+BN+LeakyReLU. SPPBlock contains a
SPP modeule and the FC represents a fully connected
layer.
Layers process Output size
Input / 3× 256× 256
Layer 1 ConvBlock1 8× 128× 128
Layer 2 ConvBlock1 16× 64× 64
Layer 3 ConvBlock2 32× 32× 32
Layer 4 ConvBlock2 64× 16× 16
Layer 5 ConvBlock3 128× 8× 8
Layer 6 SPPBlock 2688× 1
Layer 7 FC 128× 1
Layer 8 FC 2× 1
which play a huge role in models for objection detec-
tion and semantic segmentation, break the limit of
fully connected layers, so that images with arbitrary
sizes can be input into convolutional networks with
fully connected layers. On the other hand, the SPP
module can extract more features from different re-
ceptive fields, thus improving the performance. Our
steganalyzer’s detail architecture is shown in Tab. 3.
3.4 Mixed Loss Function
In previous works, Baluja [12] used the mean square
error (MSE) between the pixels of original images
and the pixels of reconstructed images as the met-
ric (5). Where c and s are the cover and secret im-
ages respectively, c
′
and s
′
are the stego and revealed
secret images respectively, and β is how to weight
their reconstruction errors. In particular, we should
note that the error term ||c−c′|| doesn’t apply to the
weights of the decoder network. On the other hand,
both the encoder network and the decoder network
receive the error signal β||s − s′|| for reconstructing
the secret image.
L(c, c′, s, s′) = ‖c− c′‖+ β‖s− s′‖ (5)
However, the MSE just penalizes large error of two
images’ corresponding pixels but disregards the un-
derlying structure in images. The human visual sys-
tem (HVS) is more sensitive to luminance and color
variations in texture-less regions. Zhao et al. [14]
analyzed the importance of perceptually-motivated
losses when the resulting image of image restoration
tasks is evaluated by a human observer. They com-
pared the performance of several losses and proposed
a novel, differentiable error function. Inspired by
their work, we introduce the structure similarity in-
dex (SSIM) [17] and its variant, the multi-scale struc-
ture similarity index (MS-SSIM) [18] into our metric.
The SSIM index separates the task of similar-
ity measurement into three comparisons: luminance,
contrast and structure. The luminance, contrast and
structure similarity of two images are measured by
(6), (7) and (8) respectively. Where µx and µy are
pixel average of image x and image y, θx and θy are
pixel deviation of image x and image y, and θxy is the
standard variance of image x and y. In addition, C1,
C2 and C3 are constants included to avoid instabil-
ity when denominators are close to zero. The total
calculation method of SSIM is shown in (9), where
l > 0,m > 0, n > 0 are parameters used to adjust
the relative importance of three components. More
detail introduction to SSIM can be found in [17]. The
value range of the SSIM index is [0, 1]. The higher the
index is, the more similar the two images are. So we
use 1 − SSIM(x, y) in our loss function to measure
the difference of two images. And the MS-SSIM [18]
is an enhanced variant of the SSIM index, so we also
introduce it into our loss function (We use MSSIM
in functions to represent MS-SSIM).
L(x, y) =
2µxµy + C1
µ2x + µ
2
y + C1
(6)
C(x, y) =
2θxθy + C2
θ2x + θ
2
y + C2
(7)
S(x, y) =
θxy + C3
θxθy + C3
(8)
SSIM(x, y) = [L(x, y)]l · [C(x, y)]m · [S(x, y)]n (9)
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Considering pixel value differences and structure
differences simultaneously, we put MSE, SSIM and
MS-SSIM together. So, the metric for the basic
steganography network in our framework is as below:
L(c, c′) = α(1− SSIM(c, c′))
+(1− α)(1−MSSIM(c, c′))
+βMSE(c, c′)
(10)
L(s, s′) = α(1− SSIM(s, s′))
+(1− α)(1−MSSIM(s, s′))
+βMSE(s, s′)
(11)
L(c, c′, s, s′) = L(c, c′) + γL(s, s′) (12)
Where α and β are hyperparameters to weigh in-
fluences of three metrics and γ is a hyperparameter
to trade off the quality of stego images and revealed
secret images. Experiment results in Sec. 4 will com-
pare the performance of different loss functions.
4 Experiments and Results
In this section, we’ll introduce our experiment de-
tails and results. Firstly, the datasets we used are
LFW [31], Pascal VOC 2012 [32] and ImageNet [30].
The Labeled Faces in the Wild (LFW) contains more
than 13000 face images belonging to 1680 people col-
lected from the web. 10k images were selected from
LFW and constituted 5k cover-secret image pairs as
our training set, others of LFW were as our valida-
tion set. Pascal VOC 2012 is a dataset designed for
object detection and semantic segmentation, we se-
lected 16k images randomly to constitute 8k cover-
secret image pairs as our training set and selected 5k
images from the remaining part as our validation set.
To further verify our model’s performance on the big
dataset, we did similar experiments on a subset of the
ImageNet. Limited by the computing power, we only
used the validation set of ImageNet as our training
set which contains 50k images, these images consti-
tuted 25k cover-secret image pairs randomly. Then
we selected 30k images from the test set of ImageNet
as our validation set.
Table 4: We use several loss functions to train our
basic model on LFW for 50 epochs. MSE + SSIM
represents a mix loss of MSE and SSIM, others are
similar, and revealed represents revealed secret im-
ages. We can see that the mix loss of MSE, SSIM
and MS-SSIM is superior than others.
Loss Function
Stego-Cover
PSNR (db)
Revealed-Secret
PSNR (db)
Stego-Cover
SSIM
Revealed-Secret
SSIM
MSE 27.97 26.30 0.8592 0.8391
SSIM 21.71 22.76 0.8877 0.8466
MSE +SSIM 27.12 26.71 0.8921 0.8805
MSE +MS-SSIM 23.92 25.97 0.8287 0.8832
MSE +SSIM +MS-SSIM 26.72 25.97 0.9305 0.9160
We used SSIM [17], Peak Signal to Noise Ration
(PSNR) as metrics to measure our model’s perfor-
mance. It is widely accepted that the PSNR doesn’t
correlate well with the human’s perception of image
quality [24], so we just used it as a reference. In addi-
tion, we designed a CNN-based steganalyzer specially
to measure our model’s security.
All settings of our model on three datasets were
the same. All parameters of our model were initial-
ized by the Xavier initialization [23] and the initial
learning rate was set as 1e-4 and was descended dur-
ing training after 20 epochs. The batch size was set
as 4 limited by the computing power, and we used
Adam to optimize our basic model. After several at-
tempts, we set α, β and γ of the loss function as
0.5, 0.3 and 0.85 respectively, which can trade off the
quality of stego images and revealed secret images
very well. Because our secret message is an image,
so we don’t need to reveal out the secret image com-
pletely. Certainly, you can set γ higher if you want
better revealed secret images. The size of all images
we used is 256×256, and the capacity of our model is
8bpp (it is equivalent to that we hide a pixel (8 bits)
in a pixel).
As shown in Tab. 4, we do several experiments
with different loss functions on the LFW, the result
demonstrates that our proposed mixed loss function
is superior to others. Tab. 5 describes final results of
our model on three datasets, we can see that the in-
visibility of our model get a little improvement, while
our model’s performance is superior to Atique’s work
intuitively as shown in Fig. 4, 5 and 6. Stego images
generated by our model are complete similar to cor-
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Table 5: We can see that the SSIM index between
stego images and their corresponding cover images of
ISGAN is higher than our basic model and Atique’s
work[13].
Model
Cover
Image
Secret
Image
Stego-Cover
PSNR (db)
Revealed-Secret
PSNR (db)
Stego-Cover
SSIM
Revealed-Secret
SSIM
Atique’s model LFW LFW 33.7 39.9 0.95
Basic model LFW LFW 34.28 33.53 0.9529 0.9453
ISGAN LFW LFW 34.63 33.63 0.9573 0.9429
Atique’s model ImageNet ImageNet 32.9 36.6 0.96 0.96
Basic model ImageNet ImageNet 34.57 33.53 0.9634 0.9510
ISGAN ImageNet ImageNet 34.89 33.42 0.9681 0.9474
Atique’s model PASCAL-VOC12 PASCAL-VOC12 33.7 35.9 0.96 0.95
Basic model PASCAL-VOC12 PASCAL-VOC12 33.79 33.47 0.9617 0.9475
ISGAN PASCAL-VOC12 PASCAL-VOC12 34.49 33.31 0.9661 0.9467
Atique’s model PASCAL-VOC12 LFW 33.8 37.7 0.96 0.95
Basic model PASCAL-VOC12 LFW 33.85 37.68 0.9612 0.9503
ISGAN PASCAL-VOC12 LFW 34.45 37.59 0.9647 0.9495
ISGAN ImageNet PASCAL-VOC12 34.57 36.58 0.9652 0.9495
Figure 4: Two examples on LFW. We can see that
our stego images are almost same as cover images,
while Atique’s stego images are yellowing. By analyz-
ing residuals between stego images and cover images,
we can see that our stego images are more similar to
cover images than Atique’s results.
responding cover images in semantic and color, this
is not reflected by SSIM. On the training set, the
average SSIM index between stego images generated
by our model and their corresponding cover images
is more than 0.985, and the average SSIM index be-
tween revealed images and their corresponding secret
images is more than 0.97. In practice, we can use
several cover images to conceal one secret image and
choose the best stego image to transfer on the Inter-
net.
On the other hand, by analyzing the detail differ-
ence between cover images and stego images, we can
see that our residual images are darker than Atiques,
Figure 5: Two examples on Pascal VOC12. We can
see that our stego images are almost same as cover
images, while Atique’s stego images are yellowing. By
analyzing residuals between stego images and cover
images, we can even distinguish the outline of se-
cret images from Atique’s residual images, while our
residual images are blurrier.
which means that our stego images are more similar
to cover images and ISGAN has stronger invisibil-
ity. Additionally, from Atiques residual images we
can even distinguish secret images outline, while our
residual images are blurrier. So these residual images
can also prove that our ISGAN is securer.
When training ISGAN, we referred some tricks
from previous works [29]. We flipped labels when
training our basic model, replaced the ReLU activa-
tion function by the LeakyReLU function, optimized
the generator by Adam, optimized the steganalyzer
by SGD and applied the L2 normalization to inhibit
overfitting. These tricks helped us to speed up train-
ing and get better results.
To prove the improvement of the security produced
by generative adversarial networks, we designed a
new experiment. We used a well-trained basic model
to generate 5000 stego images on LFW. These 5000
stego images and their corresponding cover images
constituted a tiny dataset. We designed a new CNN-
based model as a binary classifier to train on the tiny
dataset. After training, we used this model to recog-
nize stego images out from another tiny dataset which
contains 2000 stego images generated by ISGAN and
their corresponding cover images. Similar experi-
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Figure 6: Two examples on ImageNet. We can
see that our stego images are almost same as cover
images, while Atique’s stego images are yellowing.
Residual images between stego images and cover im-
ages show that our stego images are more similar to
cover images than Atique’s results.
Dataset Basic Model ISGAN (50) ISGAN (100) ISGAN (150)
LFW 0.8305 0.8059 0.7887 0.7825
Pascal-VOC12 0.7953 0.769 0.756 0.7438
ImageNet 0.7814 0.7655 0.7462 0.7360
Table 6: Accuracy of CNN-based steganalysis model
on tiny-datasets generated by basic model and IS-
GAN training for different epochs. Along with the
training going, we can see that the security of ISGAN
is improving slowly.
ments were done on the other two datasets. The
results can be seen from Tab. 6. ISGAN strength-
ens indeed the security of our basic model. And with
the training going, we can see that the security of
ISGAN is improving slowly.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
Fig. 7 shows the difference between revealed images
and their corresponding secret images. It shows that
this kind of model cannot reveal out secret images
completely. This is accepted as the information in
the secret image is very redundant. However, it is
unsuitable for tasks which need to reveal the secret
Figure 7: Secret images’ residual image on three
datasets. We can see that there are differences be-
tween original secret images and our revealed secret
images, which means that ISGAN is a lossy steganog-
raphy.
information out completely.
As we described before, ISGAN can conceal a gray
secret image into a color cover image with the same
size excellently and generate stego images which are
almost the same as cover images in semantic and
color. By means of the adversarial training, the se-
curity is improved. In addition, experiment results
demonstrate that our mixed loss function based on
SSIM can achieve the state-of-art performance on the
steganography task.
In addition, our steganography is done in the spa-
tial domain and stego images must be lossless, oth-
erwise some parts of the secret image will be lost.
There may be methods to address this problem. It
doesn’t matter if the stego image is sightly lossy since
the secret image is inherently redundant. Some noise
can be added into the stego images to simulate the
image loss caused by the transmission during train-
ing. Then our decoder network should be modified to
fit both the revealing process and the image enhance-
ment process together. In our future work, we’ll try
to figure out this problem and improve our model’s
robustness.
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